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NOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW -

FIRST AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS

TUITION PAYMENTS BY STATE TO SECTARIAN SCHOOLS

Plaintiff, resident taxpayer, sought a declaratory judgment
regarding the constitutionality of action taken by the local school
board in making tuition payments on behalf of students attending Roman Catholic secondary schools. The school board's action
was taken pursuant to a Vermont statute1 which provided that
the local school boards should either maintain public high schools
or provide secondary educational facilities at schools selected by
parents of pupils. Rather than maintain a public high school,
the board chose to authorize and make payments of tuition to
various sectarian (Roman Catholic) schools in the pupils' behalf. 2 Instruction in Roman Catholicism was included in the
curricula of the schools involved, but was a required subject only
for students of the Roman Catholic faith. The trial court held
the payments to be contrary to the Federal Constitution. On
appeal to the Supreme Court of Vermont, held, affirmed. The
payment of tuition directly to religious denominational schools
by a school district which maintains no public educational facilities constitutes "establishment of religion" in violation of the
first and fourteenth amendments to the Federal Constitution.
Swart v. South
Burlington Town School District, 167 A.2d 514
3
(Vt. 1961).

The first amendment 4 declares that Congress shall make no
law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof. The United States Supreme Court has
1.

VT.

STAT.

ANN. 16:793 (1958): "(a)

Each town district shall maintain

a high school or furnish secondary instruction . . . for its advanced pupils at a
high school or academy, to be selected by the parents or guardian of the pupil. ...

"(b)

Each town district shall pay tuition but not in excess of $400.00 per

pupil per school year ..
"
2. It does not appear from the court's statement of the facts that any schools
other than those under the auspices of a religious denomination were available in
the district.

3. The court stated that the resolute history of the religious freedom doctrine
of the Federal Constitution seems more demanding than that of the Vermont
Constitution; therefore the case would be decided under the federal constitution.
4. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
5. Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 342 (1899) : "The oppressive measures
. inflicted by the governments of Europe for many ages, to compel parties to
conform, in their religious beliefs and modes of worship, to the views of the most
numerous sect, and the folly of attempting in that way to control the mental
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declared 6 that the religious guarantees of the first amendment
are embraced by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.7 The first amendment prohibits governmental action
tending to propagate any or all religion," but at the same time
protects the individual's freedom to worship as he pleases. 9 The
government is not required, under the first amendment, to be
an adversary of religion. 10 To this end, under compulsory attendance laws, a child may attend a sectarian school so long as
the secular education there provided complies with state standards.1" Constitutional problems arise, however, where the state
attempts to confer positive benefits on all school children which
incidentally inure to schools maintained by religious groups.
Broadly speaking, the United States Supreme Court has allowed
12
these benefits where they do not exceed certain limits.

In the landmark case of Everson v. Board of Education,3 the
United States Supreme Court upheld as constitutional a New
Jersey statute authorizing parents of children attending public,
private, and sectarian schools to be reimbursed for school transportation costs from state funds. This holding was foreshad4 in which
owed by Cochran v. Board of EducationM
the Supreme
1
5
Court sustained a Louisiana statute providing for the distribution of standard state textbooks to all public, private, and sectarian school children without charge. 6 In Cochran, however,
the alleged unconstitutionality was not "establishment of religion" under the first amendment, but use of public funds for
private purposes in violation of the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. The practice of allowing public classrooms to be used for religious instruction during school hours
operations of persons, and enforce an outward conformity to a prescribed standard,
led to the adoption of the [first] amendment."
6. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
7. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
8. Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1946).
9. See Zorach v. Clausen, 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
10. Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1946).
11. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
12. Zorach v. Clausen, 343 U.S. 306 (1952) ; McCollum v. Board of Education,
333 U.S. 203 (1948) ; Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1946).
13. 330 U.S. 1 (1946).
14. 281 U.S. 370 (1930).
15. LA. R.S. 17:351 (1950).
16. Cochran v. Board of Education, 281 U.S. 370 (1930). The court pointed
out that the books furnished those children attending private schools were the
same books furnished children attending public schools. Quoting from Borden v.
Board of Education, 168 La. 1005, 1020, 123 So. 655, 660 (1928), the court
stated: "The schools . . . are not the beneficiaries of these appropriations. They
obtain nothing from them, nor are they relieved of a single obligation, because of
them. The school children and the state alone are the beneficiaries." Id. at 375.
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was declared unconstitutional in McCollum v. Board of Education.17 However, in Zorach v. Clausen' the United States Supreme Court upheld a program of releasing children from public
schools on a voluntary basis to attend religious classes elsewhere.
The court distinguished McCollum in that there the public classrooms were used for religious instruction and the force of the
public school was used to promote that instruction, while in
Zorach the public schools did no more than accommodate their
schedules to a program of outside religious instruction.
The New York Supreme Court, prior to Everson, held19 that a
statute authorizing the use of public funds for transportation of
pupils to parochial schools could not be upheld on the ground
that the purpose of providing such transportation was to promote the interests of the controlling religious or sectarian institutions. In Almond v. Day,20 the Supreme Court of Virginia held
unconstitutional a statute authorizing reimbursement of certain
parents for amounts expended in paying tuition to religious
schools. The court reasoned 21 that such legislation was invalid
because it utilized public funds to support religious institutions
contrary to the principles set forth in the Everson case, because
it afforded sectarian institutions an opportunity to reach pupils
for the purpose of religious instruction, and because it compelled
taxpayers to contribute money for the propagation of religious
opinions which they did not necessarily believe.
It has been suggested that the constitutionality of governmental aid to religious schools depends upon whether the aid is
"direct" or "indirect. '22 It is contended that when the primary
beneficiary of the appropriation is the pupil, the school benefiting only incidentally, constitutional prohibitions have not been
violated. However, when the direct benefits of the legislation
inure to the religious schools, the result is an "establishment of
religion" in contravention of the first amendment. This theory
seems to oversimplify the problem. It would seem that when a
parochial school receives any governmental aid, "directly" or
17. 333 U.S. 203 (1948). The court reasoned that: "The operation of the
State's compulsory education system thus assists and is integrated with the
program of religious instruction carried on by separate religious sects."
18. 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
19. Judd v. Board of Education, 278 N.Y. 200, 15 N.E.2d 576 (1938).
20. 197 Va. 419, 89 S.E.2d 851 (1955).
21. Id. at 430, 89 S.E.2d at 858.
22. Note, 29 FORDAM L. REV. 578, 580 (1961): "[C]ourts should look to
the competing societal values and to whether the church is the direct or indirect
beneficiary of the aid."
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"indirectly," the parent religious organization becomes free to
divert equivalent funds to other religious purposes, which would
normally be expended for the benefit the government provides.
A better analysis would seem to be that so long as the form of
state aid does not tend to promote secular education tainted by a
sectarian world-view, the incidental benefits to the organized religion do not make the aid constitutionally objectionable.
The problem does not appear to be whether or not religious
schools are aided, or, if aided, whether the aid is direct or indirect; rather the question appears to be to what extent the program aids secular education which is objectionably colored by
sectarian philosophy. Under this theory the Everson case may
be explained on the ground that the financial assistance provided
merely relieved parents of the expense of transporting their children to school. Religious precepts were not thereby imposed on
the secular education of the children. Although Zorach is more
difficult to explain, it is clear that the public education program,
as a whole, remained unimbued by religious philosophy. The
pupils went elsewhere for religious instruction and sectarian
doctrine was not injected into the secular program. But in McCollum there was a clear danger of the public education being
affected by religious philosophy where religious instruction was
being offered in the public school buildings during school hours.
The instant case2 held that the payments of tuition directly
to religious schools by a school district which maintains no public educational facilities constitutes an "establishment of religion" in violation of the Federal Constitution. This substantial
departure from the principle that education provided by the
state should not be tainted by sectarian philosophy would seem
to accord with similar results reached by the United States Supreme Court in the decisions analyzed above. Since education
administered by a religious order would seem effectively to preclude neutrality, it is submitted that the court in the instant case
reached a proper decision.
Paul G. Borron III
23. Swart v. South Burlington Town School District, 167 A.2d. 514 (Vt.
1961).

